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Abstract: This article aims to explain citizens’ support for the Law on the Use of Languages (LUL) through 
their demographic characteristics, political participation, party affiliation and ethnic belonging. We base this 
article on an empirical ordered logistic regression models using an original database of 669 Macedonian 
respondents. We compare the support of Macedonian public for the LUL with the support for the general 
idea of promotion of the use of the languages of the non-majority ethnic communities in Macedonia. We 
argue that both the support for promotion of minority languages in Macedonia, as well as the support for 
this concrete Law depends mainly on citizens’ ethnicity and party affiliation. We find statistically significant 
opposition for the LUL among the ethnic Macedonians, the (Macedonian / mainstream) opposition parties, 
the participants in the so called ‘For a Shared Macedonia’ initiative, and those whose mother tongue is a 
minority language other than the Albanian.  
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1
 In this article the name Macedonia or Republic of Macedonia for the country whose current name is the Republic of 
North Macedonia is used due to the fact that the actions described in the text took place before the country’s name 
change.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The linguistic diversity in Macedonia, reflecting its ethnic structure, has always 
been considered a cultural treasure of the Macedonian society.2 Be that as it may, the 
language policy has been among the most politicized issues in the country, always in 
the focal point of parties’ electoral campaigns. 
The Law on the Use of Languages (LUL) of 2018, stipulating the Albanian 
language as a second official language on the whole territory of Macedonia, provoked 
once again a fierce public debate. While the government promoted the law as а policy 
adopted for promotion of the use of all non-majority ethnic communities’ languages in 
Macedonia (Government of RNM 2018), the opposition accused the government of 
adopting a law which lacks larger public support, it is not evidence-based, it is 
unconstitutional, and it harms the status of the Macedonian language and identity. 
(Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 6 - 11). The opposition parties assessed the LUL as 
unnecessary because the 2008 Law had already assured the official use of the Albanian 
language at local level, along with the use of the smaller national minorities, in those 
local units where national minorities make more than 20% of the population. 
Even though the rhetoric within the political scene, academia and public 
opinion was largely contrasting, a generally positive attitude towards the idea for a 
further promotion of the use of the languages of national minorities prevailed in the 
public discourse. The main critique was directed toward the procedure of adoption of 
the law, the constitutionality of its contents and the exclusion of the stakeholders from 
the consultation processes. (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 20) The lack of public 
debate suggests that the stakeholders were not consulted before the law adoption, 
which we can also see in the lack of publicly available analyses on the issue. 
Thus, in this article we address the issue of public support for the LUL and we 
aim to explain it through voters’ political participation, party affiliation, ethnic belonging 
and socio-demographic characteristics. We compare the support of the Macedonian 
public for the LUL with the support for the general idea of promotion of the use of the 
languages spoken by the non-majority ethnic communities in Macedonia. 
We base this article on a quantitative analysis. We run logistic regression 
models using an original data-base of 669 Macedonian voters. We argue that the 
general support for the promotion of minority languages in Macedonia, as well as the 
support for this concrete LUL, depends mainly on ethnicity, party affiliation and political 
participation of the voters. We shall prove that the significant opposition comes from 
the ethnic Macedonians, the (ethnic Macedonian/mainstream) opposition parties, the 
participants in the so called ‘For a Shared Macedonia’ movement, and those whose 
                                                          
2
 The Macedonian language is the mother tongue to 66.49% of the population, the Albanian language to 25.12%, the 
Turkish language to 3.55% and the rest goes for Roma, Serbian, Vlach and some other languages. 
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mother tongue is minority language other than the Albanian. On the other hand we 
expect to find higher chances for support for the LUL among the supporters of the 
governmental parties and the participants in the ‘Colorful Revolution’. 
Through the next five subsections we shall introduce the reader with the 
contextual background, the hypotheses, the methodological approach and data, the 
results and our final conclusions. 
 
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia allowed the use of minority 
languages in local self-government units if the language community was majority,3 
(Bliznakovski 2011), while the 2001 constitutional (amendments) introduced major 
changes in the official use of the languages of minority communities, which according to 
Treneska-Deskoska (2017, 64) influenced the quality and clarity of the new provisions 
and caused different interpretations during their statutory regulation and everyday 
application. The 2008 Law on the Use of Languages spoken by at least 20% of the 
citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and the units of the local self-government (Official 
Gazette 2008/2011) expressively improved the use of languages of no majority ethnic 
communities. Official languages within the local self-government according to this law 
could be languages used by 20% of citizens living in the relevant local government, and 
languages that make up less than 20% could also use their language as official if the 
municipal council adopts such decision. In 30 out of 81 municipalities, together with the 
City of Skopje, the Albanian language was official at the level of those municipalities 
(Bliznakovski 2014), while Turkish, Serbian, Vlach, Romani and Bosniak were used 
according to the same rules in a smaller number of municipalities (Bliznakovski 2011). 
Yet, numerous remarks (from different nature) appeared on the implementation of the 
2008 Law (Bliznakovski 2014, Treneska-Deskoska 2017, 65-6). 
Because the legal provisions regulating the official use of languages in 
Macedonia were always a result of difficult negotiations between the parties speaking 
for the ethnic-Albanian community and the leading mainstream/ethnic-Macedonian 
parties, Treneska-Deskoska (2017) argues that some of the provisions remained unclear 
and open to different interpretations. She (Treneska-Deskoska 2017, 67) will further 
claim that, in order to manipulate their electorate, immature politicians, “locked in ethnic 
suites”, obstruct building inter-ethnic peace and intentionally fuel mistrust among ethnic 
groups by keeping them in fear of the ‘enemies’ (from other ethnic groups). The 2016 
pre-elections in Macedonia were expected to put an end to the political crisis that 
endured for several years before. The contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2015) seen in 
                                                          
3
 Additionally, the municipal council could decide on the official use of the languages spoken by at least 50% of the 
population in that municipality. 
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the anti-governmental protests and the counter protests was ‘silenced’ by an 
‘aggressive’ party campaign coming from both the incumbent parties and the then 
opposition. The always dominating inter-ethnic issues in Macedonia, which according to 
Engström (2002) happen when the state and civil society in a country are weak, have 
once more found their space in party programms, with the language policy being in the 
spotlight.  
Marácz (2014, 46) argues that language groups that do not control the state 
language are excluded from power and therefore struggle for recognition in order to 
get access to the power structure of the state in their first language. The issue of the 
recognition of the Albanian language as a second official language on the whole 
territory was vigorously campaigned by the Albanian parties and, albeit ambiguously, by 
the mainstream Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (the Macedonian acronym 
SDSM) before the 2016 elections. Yet, the very narrow electoral difference between the 
two biggest parties from the so called ‘Macedonian block’ empowered the parties from 
the ‘Albanian Block’ in the coalition bargaining process. Therefore, the post-electoral 
joint ‘Albanian Platform’ (Mejdini 2017) emphasized the issue of the Albanian language 
recognition as one of the imperatives for the ethnic-Albanian parties. The “Albanian” 
mandates were crucial for forming a government which eventually resulted in a change 
of power.  
The new government led by SDSM in its 2017-2020 program (Government of 
the RNM 2017a), commited itself to support a proposal for a legal solution for the use of 
languages that will extend the use of the official language spoken by more than 20% of 
the citizens. In the National Program for the Adoption of the Law of the European 
Union 2017-2019 the Government stated that the activities to promote the policy of the 
use of the official languages of communities could continue, and that the Secretariat for 
the Implementation of the Framework Agreement would prepare action plan(s) on how 
to achieve the set of goals in the Review of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement for Social Cohesion. The Government's ‘Plan 3-6-9’ (Government of the 
RNM 2017b) envisaged the adoption of a Draft Law on the Use of Languages, but the 
Draft LUL was not among the initiatives with high priority within the program of the 
Government for the period June-December 2017. The Draft LUL was ready in August 
2017, but a strategic planning for the law is missing from the strategic plan 2017-2019 of 
the Ministry of Justice (the proposer of the LUL) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 9). 
In the period between September and November 2017, after the first reading in 
the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, the Committee on European Affairs (CEA), 
the Committee on the Political System and Inter-Ethnic Relations (CPSIER) and the 
Legislative Committee (LC) each recommended that the draft law goes for a second 
reading. Thus, in November the draft law was considered and it was concluded that it 
was acceptable for a second reading. At the second readings by CEA and LC, 90 
amendments submitted by the Members of Parliament were not open to hearing, 
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because pursuant to Article 171c8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the 
Republic of Macedonia (2013), the deadline of at least three working days for hearing 
the amendments (stipulated for laws having the European Flag) had expired. At the LC 
session the draft law was implemented in a further procedure, and on 11 January, 2018, 
in the absence of the opposition, the LUL was passed at the Assembly of the Republic of 
Macedonia. The President of the Republic of Macedonia did not sign the decree on the 
LUL. Оn 14 March, 2018, the LUL was voted for the second time in the Assembly, with 
none of the 35,569 previously submitted amendments from the opposition being 
accepted. The President of the Republic of Macedonia for the second time did not sign 
the decree on the LUL (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 20). 
Finally, on 14 January, 2019, LUL was published in the Official Gazette, signed 
only by the President of the Assembly of Republic of Macedonia, without signature of 
the President of Republic of Macedonia.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The issues with the short procedure of the Law adoption (deriving from the 
‘European Flag’) that partially resulted in lack of consultations with the stakeholders, and 
the avoidance of the parliamentary majority to discuss the opposition’s amendments, 
ignited severe debate in the public. This consultation void was also seen in the scarce 
public opinion inquires. Very few national public opinion surveys are available on the 
language policy in Macedonia and the very LUL. The first offered national survey was 
conducted immediately after the announcement of the LUL draft proposal by the ‘Pavel 
Shatev’ Institute, on a sample of 1000 respondents. The survey reveals very law support 
for the LUL. 88% from the respondents did not support the law, and 80% believed that 
the law leads to federalization of Macedonia (Kanal 5 2017). 
In February 2018, the Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ - Skopje (IDSCS 
2018) conducted a national survey on a representative sample of 1000 respondent. 
However the available results explain citizens’ perceptions of the practice of use of the 
languages in Macedonia after the adoption of LUL. According to this survey 57% of the 
respondents believe that the Macedonian language will be used as a common language 
in Macedonia, and 34% believed that each ethnic community will use its own language. 
The perceptions in this survey differed according to the party affiliation of the 
respondents and their level of trust in the institutions. 51% from the respondents believe 
that the LUL will not improve the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, while 44% do not. 
The opinions in this case depend on respondents’ party affiliation and ethnicity. The 
voters for the opposition party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-
Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (the Macedonian acronym VMRO-
DPMNE) were less optimistic than the voters for the governing SDSM. The voters for the 
ethnic-Albanian parties were very optimistic, but those voting for smaller ethnic-
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Albanian party were less optimistic than those voting for the leading ethnic-Albanian 
party in government that proposed the law. A survey on a sample of 669 respondents, 
conducted by the Center for Deliberative Democracy- Dialogue (CDDD) in April-May 
2018, managed to cover a spectrum of questions addressing the LUL, which provided a 
more thorough analysis on the motives for citizens’ perceptions on LUL. 64.1% of the 
citizens do not support the law at all, while only 18.7% extremely support it. As 
regarding the idea that the use of languages of non-majority communities in 
Macedonia should be promoted, 45% do not support it at all, while 22% consider it as 
very necessary (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 27). The trend of support between these 
two issues is largely analogous. Yet, the question remains: what explains the public 
opinion on the LUL? 
Although many factors could be part of the explanation of the citizens’ level of 
support for LUL and for the very idea of promotion of the use of non-majority 
languages some are stronger than others. This has been thoroughly elaborated in 
Rizankoska and Trajkoska’s (2018) work where we can see that among the most 
influential factors that created the public opinion on the LUL were: the content of the 
very law, the constitutional and the legal aspects of the adoption of the law, and their 
opinion on the concept of multiculturalism in Macedonia. On the other hand, we can 
see how voters themselves stated that their ethnicity and their opinion on the political 
parties that adopted the law were the least important reasons for their own positive or 
negative perceptions of the LUL (2018, 29). 
We, therefore, test whether indeed ethnic belonging of the citizens, including 
their mother tongue, their party affiliation and political participation stand aside in the 
process of public opinion formation. We shall argue, nonetheless, that it is mostly 
ethnicity and political beliefs (typically party attachment) that create the public opinion 
in this case, and that socio-demographic characteristic has almost no explanatory 
power. We will cluster the variables in three main sets of hypotheses.  
To start with the first cluster, we believe political participation has the highest 
explanatory power. Thus, we hypothesize that those respondents that in 2016 national 
elections voted for the SDSM Coalition (then the leading opposition party, and after 
2017 the leading governmental party) should support the LUL. The reasoning behind 
this is because SDSM, along with the ethnic Albanian party – Democratic Union for 
Integration (DUI), was the party that proposed the Law and campaigned the very issue 
of bilingualism (albeit ambiguously) before the 2016 elections (H1). We also expect to 
find positive perceptions on the LUL among those citizens who voted for the parties 
representing the ethnic-Albanian community because the Law promotes the use of this 
very ethnic group’s language (H3). Negative opinion on the LUL is expected to come 
from those citizens voting for the opposition parties in the moment of drafting and 
adopting of the law (mostly VMRO-DPMNE and Levica), which openly opposed LUL, 
and strongly advocated for its withdrawal (H2).  
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VMRO-DPMNE has opposed the idea of the bilingualism on the whole territory 
even during the pre-electoral campaign, but have reacted more strongly on the lack of 
public debate (VMRO-DPMNE 2017) and asked for the withdrawal of the European flag 
from the law because the party considered it unconstitutional. (VMRO DPMNE 2018a, 
VMRO-DPMNE 2018b) Therefore, the party proposed almost 36000 amendments to the 
law and warned on the procedural mistakes in the Macedonian Assembly (VMRO-
DPMNE 2018c). Levica, as a party, which declares itself a class oriented, above-ethnic 
and internationalist, opposes the LUL because it perceives it as a populist attempt by 
both governing parties SDSM and DUI to ‘deal’ with poverty. Levica opposes the 
‘percentage-basing’ of the law (like the very Ohrid Framework Agreement) because the 
‘20% criteria’ (reflecting the percentage of the ethnic-Albanian population in 
Macedonia) excludes the smaller ethnic minorities in the country such as Turks, Vlachos, 
Serbs, Roma etc. Thus, according to Levica, the political opportunism that had driven 
the government to adopt this low will cause deeper segregation within the Macedonian 
society on ethnic basis and will increase the nationalism once more  (Levica 2018). Levica 
asked the Constitutional Court for LUL’s invalidation due to its unlawful adoption and 
the lack of the Presidents’ decree which is necessary for its ratification (Levica 2019). 
Two additional political explanations are feasible. Namely, we expect that given 
the recent turbulent period of social movements, political protests and counter protests, 
citizens will have different opinions depending on their participation in some of those 
events of contentious politics. Due to the campaign and the repertoire of the 
Macedonian ethno-nationalist movement ‘For a Shared Macedonia’ (FSM), which 
directly opposed the ‘Albanian Platform’, we expect that the participants in this 
movement will have negative opinion on LUL (H5) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2017). 
On the other side, we shall expect positive opinion on LUL coming from the 
participants in the 2016 ‘Colorful Revolution’ (CR) (H4). This is due to two possible 
reasons. Firstly, the CR’s campaign against corruption was openly unifying and 
welcoming for different individual participants regardless of their ethnicity, socio-
demographic status and political affiliation. Secondly, SDSM (the party that proposed 
the law) was a substantial contributor to the movement (especially in the advanced 
stages of it) (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2019). 
Although in the above presented hypotheses ethnicity is inevitably intertwined 
with political participation, we shall address this aspect more directly through few more 
variables (the second cluster). We expect that ethnic Macedonians are likely to oppose 
LUL due to the fears for the status of the Macedonian language, the Macedonian ethic 
identity, and the unitary status of the country (H6). This, as it has been mentioned 
before, was campaigned by the opposition parties (Rizankoska and Trajkoska 2018, 33; 
2019). Additionally, we should look at the response from the smaller ethnic groups 
(respondents with mother tongue other than Macedonian and Albanian). They might 
support the Law because it is a promotion of the use of the languages of the non-
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majority communities in Macedonia, or oppose it because their language is not 
addressed within the Law as it was done with the Law of 2008 (Rizankoska and 
Trajkoska 2018, 52). Thus, we can expect two possible directions of this hypothesis (H7). 
Finally, the place of living is indirectly related to the ethnic structure of the 
country. We can expect that permanent residents in the Southeastern region of 
Macedonia (where the Albanian community does not make a local majority) are likely to 
oppose bilingualism on the whole territory of Macedonia (H8). The rest of the regions 
where Albanian community either makes majority in most of the municipalities, either 
municipalities are more ethnically mixed, should be more prone to accept the idea of 
bilingualism.  
In the final cluster, we shall control for socio demographic characteristics of the 
respondents: age, gender, level of education, monthly family income and 
profession/status of a civil servant. We might expect that younger people are more 
prone to change, thus they shall support LUL (H9). Gender could go both in positive or 
negative direction. (H10). Better educated people are likely to be more open minded 
and liberal while at the same time they are likely to be better informed and oppose the 
Law due to the failures in its adoption procedure (H11). The more economically vital 
families are better informed and therefore oppose the law due to the procedure 
controversies associated with LUL (H12). Due to the Civil Servant status the respondents 
will likely support the government’s policies, therefore LUL. This can be related to the 
patronage and/or partization of state institutions. (H13). 
The same clusters of hypotheses/variables shall constitute the three models 
testing for both dependent variables. The same logic elaborated above is applied for 
the ‘PML’ variable as well.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND DATA 
 
The unit of analysis in this work is the Macedonian voter (citizen) regardless of 
their current residency (in the country or abroad). We rely on an original data gathered 
in the period from 7 April to 10 May, 2018 that has thoroughly considered voters’ 
positions on the issue. The survey covered 669 respondents, which according to their 
place of residence, 91% lived in the country and 9% abroad. The marginal error is +/- 
5% because the sample is lower than a standard representative sample at national level. 
Of those who live in Macedonia, the majority of the respondents, 61%, are from the 
Center, and 39% from the outskirts of Macedonia, i.e., 61% are from the Skopje region, 
26% from the Southeast, and 13% from the Northwest. The questionnaires were filled in 
electronically4, in Macedonian or in Albanian language, and an accent was put on the 
                                                          
4
 We have distributed the google docs questionaire on line via social media and via banner-adds in six internet 
portals that appeal to different groups of readers in terms of age, ethnicity and political affiliation.  
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balance of all ethnic groups. Namely, 71% of the respondents are declared ethnic 
Macedonians, and 19.6% are ethnic Albanians. For 81% of the respondents the 
Macedonian is the mother tongue, and for 14% is the Albanian language. We 
acknowledge that on-line surveys can have shortcomings in terms of balancing age, sex, 
educational categories etc., compared to face-to-face or telephone surveys. In addition, 
given their voluntary participation, we know that the respondents in this sample will 
most likely be more interested in the research question than an average voter. 
Nevertheless, additional four focus groups conducted within the same project, stressed 
the underrepresented socio-demographic groups from this survey (such as women, 
older and lower educated people) and confirmed the same trend in the citizens 
opinions as in this empirical database (Rizankoska and Trajkoska, 2018, 11). This gives us 
a reassurance in the validity of the sample.  
In order to address both the issue of support for the LUL and for the general 
idea of promoting the use of languages of non-majority communities in Macedonia, we 
will use two different dependent variables. The first one (labeled as LUL) shall measure 
the public support for the LUL. The variable is operationalized as dichotomous variable 
i.e., ‘zero’ means that the respondent does not support the adoption of the law, and 
‘one’ means that the respondent supports the adoption of the law. For this purpose we 
use the original data-set ordinal categorical variable that measures the level of support 
in a scale from 1 to 5 (where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest). Due to the alarm 
originating from the unbalanced frequency distribution across the 5 ordinal categories5, 
we have decided to use a simpler operationalization of the dependent variable. So, we 
have gathered the scores for 1 and 2 in the category ‘no support’ vs. the scores of 3, 4 
and 5 in the category ‘support’ for the LUL.  
The second dependent variable (labeled as PML) measures the support of the 
public for general promotion of the use of the non-majority communities’ languages in 
the country. This variable as well is operationalized as a dichotomous variable with ‘zero’ 
meaning that the respondent does not support the idea of promotion of minority 
groups’ languages and ‘one’ meaning that the respondent supports that idea. This 
variable is also recoded from the original 5 category ordinal variable, and the same 
statistical details apply here as in the case of the variable ‘LUL’. As it has been discussed 
before, the level of support for both issues is low. Table 1 contains the mean scores for 
both dependent variables (LUL and PML), operationalized as dummy variables, and we 
                                                          
5
 The ologit models for the 5 ordinal categories dependent variable did not permit for a brant test (that shall check for 
parallel line assumption) (Williams 2006) which happened due to a very few cases within some of the categories. That 
impedes a reliable statistical analysis involving 13 independent variables. In order to keep the explanatory variables 
unchanged we have decided to simplify the dependent variable. Namely, from the 5 category variables (from 1 to 5) 
we find average score of 2.15 for the first issue, and 2.43 average score for the second one, thus we decided to 
recode the variables as ‘no support’ = 1 and 2 category, and ‘support’ = 3,4 and 5 category together. The statistical 
significance and the direction of the hypothesis, nevertheless, remained the same in both ologit and logit models.  
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see that 33% of the respondents have positive attitude towards LUL, while 40% have 
positive attitude towards the idea of minority languages’ promotion in Macedonia. Thus, 
we see a slightly higher support for the idea of promoting the use of non-majority 
communities’ languages than for the proposed solution for the language policy i.e., the 
LUL.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for all the variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
LUL 669 .327 .467 0 1 
PML 669 .395 .489 0 1 
SDSM 669 .111 .314 0 1 
Mac_opposition 669 .230 .421 0 1 
Alb_parties 669 .114 .318 0 1 
CR 669 .289 .453 0 1 
FSM 669 .109 .312 0 1 
EthnicMac 669 .715 .452 0 1 
SmallMinLang 669 .052 .223 0 1 
Southeast 669 .277 .448 0 1 
Age 669 2.063 1.088 1 5 
Gender 669 .395 .489 0 1 
Education 669 3.755 1.139 1 5 
Income 669 3.396 1.141 1 5 
CivilServant 669 .150 .357 0 1 
 
Although the very data-base we use is rich in information regarding the 
motives for the level of support for both questions and it goes deeper into inquiring the 
perceptions on many different aspects of the law (such as the procedure of adoption, 
the content, the impact of the law on the inter-ethnic relations in the country etc.), this 
analysis focuses primarily on the political participation and party affiliation, ethnicity and 
socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. Thus among the independent 
variables we have 13 explanatory variables. From Table 1 we see the summary statistics 
for each variable, i.e., how each variable is operationalized, their mean and standard 
deviation.  
Table 2 contains the expected direction of the hypotheses/variables for both 
dependent variables. To start with the first cluster, the dummy variable ‘SDSM’ counts 
(with a one) those that voted for SDSM in the December 2016 elections. The next 
dummy variable ‘Mac_opposition’ measures (with a one) those that in the 2016 election 
voted for two parties that have remained in opposition (VMRO-DPMNE and LEVICA). 
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The dichotomous variable ‘Alb_parties’ measures (with a one) the vote for a 
party representing the ethnic-Albanian community. Additionally, the dummy variable 
‘CR’ stands for ‘The Colorful Revolution’ and measures (with a one) the participation of 
the respondent in the ‘I Protest’ movement in 2016. The final variable of this cluster 
‘FSM’ measures (with a one) the respondents who participated in the 2017 ‘For a Shared 
Macedonia’ movement.  
Then, we add the ‘ethnicity’ cluster and we start by the dummy variable 
‘EthnicMac’ that (with a one) depicts those respondents that feel like ethnic 
Macedonians. The variable ‘SmallMinLang’ indicates that the respondent’s mother 
tongue is a language spoken by an ethnic group that is a non-majority but at the same 
time not ethnic-Albanian. This variable is also a dichotomous one and it indicates (with a 
one) the respondent that does speak such ‘small minority’ language. The third variable 
‘Southeast’ (also a dummy) measures (with a one) the respondents who live in the 
southeast of the country as opposed to those who live in the Skopje region or the 
northwestern regions (zero). 
We finally add the third cluster of control variables that depict the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents. We measure variable ‘Age’ as an 
ordinal categorical variable where ‘1’ is the age group below 30 yars old, ‘2’ is 31 to 40, 
‘3’ is 41 to 50, ‘4’ is 51 to 60, and ‘5’ is above 61 years old. The ‘Gender’ variable is 
measured as a dichotomous variable where ‘zero’ is male and ‘one’ is female. The 
‘Education’ variable is measured as a five ordinal category variable where ‘1’ is primary 
school or less, ‘2’ is secondary/high school, ‘3’ is higher vocational education, ‘4’ is 
university education, and ‘5’ is MA or PhD level of education. 
 
Table 2. Hypotheses direction and independent variables operationalization 
 
Hypo-
thesis 
Variable Variable Label Variable type 
Expected 
direction 
H1 SDSM Respondents voted for SDSM. 
Dichotomous  
0= did not vote  1= voted 
+ 
H2 Mac_opposition 
Respontents voted for either 
VMRO-DPMNE or Levica. 
Dichotomous  
0= did not vote 1= voted 
- 
H3 Alb_parties 
Respondents voted for an 
ethnic Albanian party. 
Dichotomous 
0= did not vote 1= voted 
+ 
H4 CR 
Respondents participated in 
the 2016 Colorful Revolution. 
Dichotomous  
0= did not participate 1= participated 
+ 
H5 FSM 
Respondents participated in 
the 2017 movement For a 
Shared Macedonia. 
Dichotomous  
0= did not participate 1= participated 
- 
H7 EthnicMac 
Respondent determines 
him/herself as an ethnic 
Macedonian. 
Dichotomous 
 0= not an ethnic Macedonian  1= ethnic 
Macedonian 
- 
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H6 SmallMinLang 
Respondents' mother tongue is 
a language from a non-
majority minority group (small 
ethnic group such as Turks, 
Roma, Serbs etc). 
Dichotomous 
 0= respondents' mother tongue is either 
Macedonian or Albanian  
1= respondents' mother tongue is a language 
spoken by a small minority group. 
-/+ 
H8 Southeast 
Respondent's permanent 
residence is in the 
Southeastern region of 
Macedonia. 
Dichotomous  
0= respondents do not reside in the Southeast 
region  
1= respondents' reside in the Southeastern 
region. 
- 
H9 Age Respondents' age. 
Categorical (ordinal)   
1= below 30,  
2 = 31 to 40,  
3= 41 to 50,  
4=51 to 60,  
5= above 61 years old. 
- 
H10 Gender Respondents' gender. 
Dichotomous 
0=male  1=female 
-/+ 
H11 Education 
Respondents' level of 
education. 
Categorical (ordinal) 
1= primary school or less, 
2 = secondary/high school,  
3=higher vocational education,  
4= university education, 
5= MA or PhD  
-/+ 
H12 Income 
Respondents' monthly family 
income. 
Categorical (ordinal)  
1=below 9000 denars,  
2= 9001 to 18000 denars,  
3= 18001 to 36000 denars,  
4 = 36001 to 60000 denars,  
5= above 60001 denars. 
- 
H13 CivilServant 
Respondents work in the public 
administration/are civil 
servants. 
Dichotomous  
0= not a civil servant  1= civil servant 
+ 
 
The ‘Income’ variable measures the monthly family income of the respondent 
and it is also a five ordinal category variable where ‘1’ is below 9000 denars, ‘2’ is from 
9001 to 18000 denars, ‘3’ is from 18001 to 36000 denars, ‘4’ is from 36001 to 60000 
denars, and ‘5’ is above 60001 denars. The variable ‘CivilServant’ is measured as a 
dichotomous variable where ‘one’ is the status of a civil servant for the respondent and 
‘zero’ is the joint number of the rest of the professional categories. From the Table I (in 
Appendix), which presents the correlation coefficients of all independent variables, we 
see that there is no danger for multicollinearity. The highest correlation coefficient -0.56 
is found between variables ‘EthnicMac’ and ‘Alb_parties’. Given the reasoning behind H4 
we check whether there is possibility for collinearly between ‘SDSM’ and ‘CR’ variables, 
but we see that the coefficient is 0.37 which is not so high.  
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RESULTS 
 
We run logistical regressions for both dependent variables (LUL and PML) 
based on the three clusters of variables. That is to say, for each dependent variable 
three models are tested. Each of the three models per dependent variable adds one set 
of variables to the previous one. Model 1 contains only the variables on political 
participation and party affiliation, Model 2 adds the variables on ethnicity, and Model 3 
adds the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. 
Table 3 contains the estimated logistical odds for all six models. The left part of 
the table shows the models on the LUL dependent variable, thus explaining the support 
for the law, while the right side contains the results from the estimated odds for the 
models predicting the support for promotion of the use of minority languages in 
Macedonia.  
Beginning from the left part of Table 3, we see that Model 1 only contains the 
variables on political participation and party affiliation, and all five variables are found to 
be statistically significant predictor of the public support for LUL. Model 2 contains the 
variables on ethnicity and improves the predicting power of the first model with two out 
of three variables being significant predictor. Finally, Model 3 has no better predicting 
power than the first two models, which means that voters’ socio-demographic 
characteristics cannot explain the public support for LUL.  
 
Table 3. Estimates of the logistical odds for support for the LUL (left) and for support for the idea of 
promotion of minority languages in Macedonia (right) 
 
 Law on the use of languages LUL  Promotion of minority languages PML 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
        
SDSM 1.560*** 1.392*** 1.344***  0.928*** 0.668** 0.624* 
 (0.292) (0.337) (0.352)  (0.282) (0.315) (0.328) 
Mac_opposition -1.308*** -1.233*** -1.236***  -0.867*** -0.740*** -0.753*** 
 (0.357) (0.409) (0.409)  (0.262) (0.286) (0.288) 
Alb_parties 4.599*** 2.584*** 2.566***  3.947*** 2.217*** 2.195*** 
 (0.654) (0.676) (0.685)  (0.602) (0.639) (0.643) 
CR 0.434* 0.739*** 0.769***  0.591*** 0.803*** 0.837*** 
 (0.225) (0.265) (0.273)  (0.205) (0.226) (0.232) 
FSM -2.529*** -2.267** -2.144**  -0.722* -0.436 -0.432 
 (0.870) (0.958) (0.928)  (0.396) (0.413) (0.415) 
EthnicMac  -2.942*** -3.116***   -2.350*** -2.436*** 
  (0.304) (0.334)   (0.280) (0.301) 
SmallMinLang  -1.487*** -1.559***   -1.521*** -1.601*** 
  (0.493) (0.506)   (0.458) (0.467) 
Southeast  0.215 0.253   0.0107 -0.00416 
  (0.275) (0.294)   (0.227) (0.242) 
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Age   0.142    0.218** 
   (0.115)    (0.0982) 
Gender   0.223    0.0109 
   (0.247)    (0.207) 
Education   0.00531    0.0810 
   (0.126)    (0.107) 
Income   0.161    0.0588 
   (0.118)    (0.0992) 
CivilServant   0.106    -0.168 
   (0.359)    (0.307) 
Constant -1.189*** 0.874*** 0.0194  -0.821*** 1.007*** 0.142 
 (0.144) (0.272) (0.611)  (0.131) (0.265) (0.535) 
Observations 669 669 669  669 669 669 
Standard errors in parentheses/ *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
So, we can conclude that in the models testing the public opinion on the LUL, 
we have proven (found statistical significance for) hypotheses 1 to 7, and failed to prove 
hypotheses 8 to 13. As expected, we find voters who voted for SDSM or en ethnic-
Albanian party (i.e., parties that proposed the law), and those who participated in the 
‘Colorful Revolution’ to be more supportive to the LUL. On the contrary, we see that 
those voting for the opposition parties (VMRO-DPMNE and Levica) and those 
participating in the ‘For a Shared Macedonia’ movement to be against it. Additionally, 
we prove that respondents declaring themselves as ethnic-Macedonians oppose the 
law. Finally, we significantly confirm the negative direction of Hypothesis 7, i.e., 
respondents whose mother tongue is a minority language other than Albanian opposes 
the law.  
If we compare the right part of Table 3 (where we have tested the public 
support for the general idea of promotion of the use of minority languages in 
Macedonia) with the left part (where we have tested the support for the LUL) we can 
see only a couple of variations in the results. Firstly, we notice that the variable ‘FSM’ is 
statistically significant only in Model 1, while keeping the same direction in the other two 
models, and then we find ‘Age’ to be a positive predictor of the support for the 
promotion of the use of minority languages (which was not statistically significant in the 
LUL models). Thus we confirm H1, H2, H3, H4, H6, H7 (also in a negative direction) and 
we reject H9.  
In order to be able to better interpret our findings we provide Table 4, which 
contains the marginal probabilities for Model 3 for both ‘LUL’ and ‘PLM’ dependent 
variables. We see the predicting power of the factor variables for voters to support the 
LUL and the general promotion of the use of minority languages when the factor 
variables go from low to high (one unit change), using the full Model 3 for both 
dependent variables.  
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The dependent variables ‘LUL’ and ‘PML’ will both be observed with the dual 
measurement: ‘zero’ score for lack of support and ‘one’ for presence of support. The 
independent dichotomous variables change from zero to one, and the categorical 
variables change gradually for one category (from the first one), while all the rest are 
held at their means.  
For the LUL model, we see the highest positive (significant) predicting power in 
variable ‘Alb_parties’. This means that the chances to support LUL among the voters for 
the Albanian parties increase for 61% compared to the rest. SDSM voters will have 32% 
more chances to support the law than the others, while the participants in the Colorful 
Revolution 16% more chances than the rest. Focusing on the ‘Age’ variable we see that 
the highest positive predicting power can be found when we change from category one 
to three. That means that respondent within the age group of 41 to 50 will have 40% 
more chances to support the law than the respondents below 30.  Focusing on the 
negative predictors, we see that the highest chances for lack of support for the LUL are 
for the ethnic Macedonian community (68%). Then, follow the participants in the ‘For a 
Shared Macedonia’ movement (with 27% more probability to oppose the law), the 
respondents whose mother tongue is a smaller ethnic group’s language (with 19% 
chances to oppose the LUL) and the voters for the two opposition parties VMRO-
DPMNE and Levica (with 15% probability to be against the LUL).  
We can notice some variations in the predicting probability power of the 
variables testing the support for the promotion of the minority languages in Macedonia. 
We see that, albeit at a lower degree, the highest chances for positive opinion on the 
idea for further promotion of the use of minority languages can be found among the 
voters for the Albanian political parties (48%), then among the participants in the CR 
(20%) and for the voters for SDSM (17%). The change in the ‘Age’ variable in the ‘PML 
model’ differs from the change in the ‘LUL model’, i.e., the highest predicting power is 
for a change from the 1st to the 5th category. That means that the group above 61 has 
31% more chances to support general promotion of the use of minority language than 
those below the age of 30. Also, we find the change from category 1 to category 3 to 
predicts positively the support for promotion of minority language, i.e., respondents 
with higher educational vocation have 35% more chances to support that idea than the 
respondents with primary education. We see no change in the trend of negative opinion 
on the law. Once more, ethnic Macedonians, those whose mother tongue is one of the 
smaller ethnic groups’ languages and those voting for the opposition parties VMRO-
DPMNE and Levica are those who have the most chances to oppose the idea of 
promotion of the minority languages (56%, 29% and 15% consequently).  
The predictable power for opposing the idea of promoting the use of minority 
languages among the ethnic Macedonians is for 12% lower than chance that ethnic 
Macedonians will oppose the very LUL. Only in few factor variables the predictable 
probabilities are higher for the PML dependent variable than for the LUL.  
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Participants in the Colorful Revolution have 4% higher chances to support the 
idea of promotion of minority languages than for the very LUL, and the respondents 
whose mother tongue is a languages spoken by a smaller ethnic group will have 10% 
more chances to oppose more the general idea of promotion of the use of minority 
languages than the very LUL. 
 
Table 4. Marginal probabilities for Model 3 in LUL and PML logistic regressions 
 
Marginal probabilities, at means 
Variable Value LUL PML 
SDSM 0 to 1 0.323** 0.168* 
Mac_opposition 0 to 1 -0.154** -0.149* 
Alb_parties 0 to 1 0.609** 0.481** 
CR 0 to 1 0.160** 0.198** 
FSM 0 to 1 -0.266** -0.114 
EthnicMac 0 to 1 -0.677** -0.565** 
SmallMinLang 0 to 1 -0.185** -0.293** 
Southeast 0 to 1 0.053 0.002 
Age 1 to 2 0.037 0.078 
 
1 to 3 -0.005 0.042 
 
1 to 4 0.113 0.152 
 
1 to 5 0.285 0.312** 
Gender 0 to 1 0.055 0.002 
Education 1 to 2 0.335** 0.296** 
 
1 to 3 0.398** 0.349** 
 
1 to 4 0.161** 0.214* 
 
1 to 5 0.245** 0.332** 
Income 1 to 2 -0.218 -0.079 
 
1 to 3 -0.118 -0.028 
 
1 to 4 -0.107 -0.063 
 
1 to 5 -0.048 0.007 
CivilServant 0 to 1 0.019 -0.037 
N   669 669 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article we have compared the general readiness of the Macedonian 
society to accept the idea of a further promotion of the use of national minority 
languages with the public’s support for the Law on the use of languages, which 
regulates the use of the official languages in Macedonia, in particular stipulating the 
Albanian language as a second official language on the whole territory.  
We have tested thirteen hypotheses on the public support for the LUL 
depending on voters’ party affiliation and political participation, ethnicity and some 
socio-demographic characteristics. We inquire that the Macedonian voter is not ready 
yet for a further promotion of the use of the minority languages, while even less ready 
to accept the concrete law that regulates the language policy in that direction (the LUL). 
Be that as it may, we notice deep party and ethnic divide within the Macedonian 
electorate, the ethnic one remaining the most pronounced one. We confirm that voters 
that support the governing parties support the LUL, while voters that support the 
opposition parties oppose it. Finally, participants in the liberal-ethnically inclusive 
‘Colorful Revolution’ support the LUL, while the participants in the nationalistic ‘For a 
Shared Macedonia’ movement oppose the LUL.  
It might seem too apparent to conclude that voters for parties that proposed 
the LUL will support it while voters for parties that took adversarial stance on the LUL will 
oppose it. Nevertheless, the asset of this conclusion in our work lays in what we failed to 
prove. Namely, variables describing the socio-demographic characteristics of the voters, 
other than ethnicity, have no explanatory power of the level of support for this language 
policy, which proves (once more) how deeply divided the Macedonian society remains 
along party and ethnic lines. Macedonian voters continue to ‘blindly’ follow political 
parties and are not capable (or willing) to assess public policies through an evidence-
based prism.  
Accommodating multiculturalism in ethnically deeply divided societies 
essentially starts with granting basic linguistic rights for all groups. In practice, granting 
civil and political rights for minority ethnic groups depends mostly on the willingness of 
the political elites, and increasingly more on the coalition bargaining capacity of the 
parties speaking for ethnic minorities. Both ethnic parties representing national 
minorities and mainstream parties are capable of deciding how to treat the issues 
concerning national minorities according to their prospects for electoral fortunes. It is 
exactly here were the voters in democratizing, ethnically heterogeneous societies with 
scarce economies are the most vulnerable. Every policy concerning national minorities 
in Macedonia still raises the alarm for possible territorial rather than cultural autonomy, 
due to the vulnerability of the Macedonian voter before the party manipulation. This 
manipulation has been conducted through various tools such is the subjective 
journalism and propaganda, or the aggressive nationalistic campaigns. Yet, the most 
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powerful of all has so far been the high practice of clientelism. Therefore, we go back to 
the essential remedy for nationalism – the rule of law. By increasing the trust in the 
political institutions, voters should be more able to ‘defend’ themselves from the 
influence of the political parties and should be able to see better the benefits of living in 
a multicultural society without the feeling of threat by the ‘others’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKWNOLEDGEMENT 
 
The data used in this article was obtained by DIALOGUE – Center for Deliberative 
Democracy as a part of the activities within the project ‘Impact assessment on the 
regulation on the use of languages’, which was a part of the sub-granting program 
‘Regulatory impact assessment in the shadow: Fostering evidence-based policy making’ 
project’. The project was financially supported by the European Union (EU), Institute for 
Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ – Skopje (IDSCS) and Center for Economic Analyses (CEA). 
The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no 
way be taken to reflect the views of the donors. 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com          
 
 
 27 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Bliznakovski, J. 2011. Нормативна рамка за јазичните права на малцинствата 
во Македонија во согласност со Охридскиот рамковен договор. Journal of 
European Issues EVRODIJALOG, Vol. 14.  
2. Bliznakovski, J. 2014. Локални јазични политики за немнозинските заедници. 
Можности за поефикасна имплементација. Скопје: Институт за демократија 
‘Социетас Цивилис’ - Скопје.  
3. Engström, J. 2002. Multi-ethnic or bi-nationalism? The framework agreement 
and the future of the Macedonian state. Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority 
Issues in Europe, 1, 1–21. 
4. Government of RNM. 2017a. Програма за рабоа на Влада на Република 
Македонија за 2017 година. Accessed 
25.03.2019.http://vlada.mk/sites/default/files/programa/2017-
2020/Programa_Vlada_RM_Juni_Dekemvri_2017.pdf 
5. Government of RNM. 2017b. План 3-6-9. Accessed 25.03.19. 
http://vlada.mk/?q=plan-3-6-9  
6. Government of RNM. 2018. ‘Законот за јазици ги унапредува правата на сите 
немнозински заедници и не предвидува нови вработувања, а македонскиот 
јазик со кирилското писмо останува единствен службен јазик и на цела 
територија на Република Македонија и во нејзините меѓународни односи’. 
Accessed 25.03.19. https://vlada.mk/node/16423  
7. Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’-Skopje (IDSCS). 2018. ‘Закон за 
употреба на јазиците.’ Accessed 25.3.19. 
https://idscs.org.mk/mk/2018/01/31/%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80
%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%84%D0%B8%D0%BA-
%D1%88%D1%82%D0%BE-
%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%82-
%D0%B3%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%93%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B
5-%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B7/  
8. Kanal 5. 2017. ‘Нова анкета на институтот „Павел Шатев”. Голем дел од 
граѓаните сметат дека новиот закон за јазици ќе предизвика 
федерализација на Mакедонија.’ Accessed 25.03.19. 
https://kanal5.com.mk/articles/293189/nova-anketa-na-institutot-pavel-shatev  
9. Law 2008. Закон за употреба на јазик што го зборуваат најмалку 20% од 
граѓаните на Република Македонија и во единиците на локалната 
самоуправа. „Службен весник на Република Македонија“, бр. 101, 13.08.2008. 
10. Levica. 2018. ‘Став на Левица за законот за двојазичност’. Accessed 25.03. 19.  
https://levica.mk/2018/03/13/dvojazichnost/  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com          
 
 
 28 
11. Levica. 2019. ‘Левица со иницијатива до Уставниот суд по повод 
„шверцуваниот” Закон за двојазичност’. 
https://antropol.mk/2019/03/04/levica-so-inicijativa-do-ustavniot-sud-po-
povod-svercuvaniot-zakon-za-dvojazicnost/  
12. Marácz, L. 2014. ‘The politics of multilingual communication: Case studies and 
research agendas’. In S. Craze & F. Lempp (Eds.), Communicating conflict: A 
multidisciplinary perspective, pp. 45–62. Oxford: InterDisciplinary Press. 
13. Mejdini, F. 2017. ‘Albanian Parties Set Terms for Macedonia's Next Govt’. Balkan 
Insight. Accessed 25.3.17. https://balkaninsight.com/2017/01/08/albanianians-
parties-in-macedonia-seven-conditions-for-the-new-government-01-07-2017/ 
14. Rizankoska, J. and Trajkoska, J. 2017. The ‘Colorful Revolution’ and the movement 
‘For a Shared Macedonia’ - symbols of an awakening participatory civic culture 
or indicators of deep party divisions in Macedonian society? A case study - 
Prilep. Political Thought Year 15, No 53, June 2017, pp. 9-29. Skopje: Konrad 
Adenauer Shtiftung and IDSCS. 
http://www.kas.de/mazedonien/en/publications/50677/  
15. Rizankoska, J. and Trajkoska, J. 2019. A Social Movement in First Person Singular: 
the Colours of the ‘Colourful Revolution’ in Macedonia. Southeastern Europe 
Journal 43.1, BRILL. 
16. Rizankoska. J., and Trajkoska, J. 2018. Impact Assessment of the Regulation on the 
Use of Languages in Macedonia. Prilep: DIALOGUE Center for Deliberative 
Democracy. https://pvrupotrebanajazicite.cddd.org.mk/final-study/  
17. Rules of Procedures of the Assembly of RM. 2013. Accessed 25.3.19. 
https://www.sobranie.mk/rules-procedures-of-the-assembly-ns_article-rules-of-
procedure-of-the-assembly-of-the-republic-of-macedonia.nspx  
18. Tilly, C., and Tarrow S. 2015. Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
19. Treneska-Deskoska, R. 2017. Accommodating Multilingualism in Macedonia. 
Social Inclusion, 2017 Volume 5, Issue 4, pp. 60–68. DOI: 10.17645/si.v5i4.1129  
20. VMRO-DPMNE. 2017. ‘Пратениците на СДСМ на најкукавички начин се 
откажаа од дебата за Законот за јазиците’. Accessed 25.03.19. https://vmro-
dpmne.org.mk/pres-centar/soopshtenija/pratenicite-na-sdsm-na-najkukavichki-
nachin-se-otkazhaa-od-debata-za  
21. VMRO-DPMNE. 2018a. ‘Да се тргне европското знаменце од Законот за 
јазиците, тој е неуставен’. Accessed 25.03.19. https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/pres-
centar/aktuelno/da-se-trgne-evropskoto-znamence-od-zakonot-za-jazicite-toj-
e-neustaven  
22. VMRO-DPMNE. 2018b. ‘Димовски побара широка дебата пред да се гласа 
двојазичноста, пратениците на СДСМ и албанските коалиционери 
инсистираат да гласаат денес’. Accessed 25.03.19. https://vmro-
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com          
 
 
 29 
dpmne.org.mk/pres-centar/aktuelno/dimovski-pobara-shiroka-debata-pred-da-
se-glasa-dvojazichnosta-pratenicite-na  
23. VMRO-DPMNE. 2018c. ‘Мицкоски: Законот за јазици е неуставен и 
неприменлив во реалноста, затоа поднесовме 36 илјади амандмани’.  
Accessed 25.03.19. https://vmro-dpmne.org.mk/pres-centar/aktuelno/zakonot-
za-jazici-e-neustaven-i-neprimenliv-vo-realnosta-zatoa-podnesovme-36  
24. Williams, R. (2006) Generalized Ordered Logit/Partial Proportional Odds Models 
for Ordinal Dependent Variables. STATA Journal Vol. 6. Issue.1, pp.58-82. Stata 
Corp LP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 5, No. 1, 2019 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com          
 
 
 30 
 
APPENDIX I 
Table I. Correlation coefficients for all independent variables 
 
 
 
  SDSM 
Mac_ 
opposition 
Alb_ 
parties 
CR FSM EthnicMac 
Small 
MinLang 
Southeast Age Gender Education Income 
Civil 
Servant 
PML 
             
LUL 
             
SDSM 1 
            
Mac_opposition -0.1476 1 
           
Alb_parties -0.0812 -0.1958 1 
          
CR 0.3645 -0.1993 -0.0720 1 
         
FSM -0.1234 0.3553 -0.0800 -0.1699 1 
        
EthnicMac -0.1147 0.2277 -0.5559 -0.0139 0.1575 1 
       
SmallMinLang 0.1098 -0.0169 -0.0418 0.0726 -0.0607 -0.2379 1 
      
Southeast 0.0696 0.1700 -0.1792 -0.0396 0.0409 0.2058 -0.0402 1 
     
Age 0.1111 0.0337 0.0746 -0.0732 -0.0070 -0.0761 0.0111 0.1487 1 
    
Gender -0.0215 -0.0347 -0.0867 -0.0078 -0.0472 0.0567 -0.0249 -0.0000 -0.0410 1 
   
Education -0.1167 -0.0601 -0.0429 0.0908 -0.0215 0.1489 0.0447 -0.2252 -0.2751 0.1121 1 
  
Income -0.0640 0.0467 -0.1450 0.0103 0.0256 0.2805 0.0302 -0.1180 -0.0960 0.0011 0.3687 1 
 
CivilServant 0.0393 0.0396 0.0877 -0.0634 0.0281 0.0330 -0.0232 -0.0436 0.0452 0.0647 0.1714 0.0676 1 
